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HOMICIDES UNDER THE COLORADO
CRIMINAL CODE
By

JOSEPH

R. QUINN*

INTRODUCTION

O N July 1, 1972,

the Colorado Criminal Code became effective. Many significant and long-needed reforms have been
accomplished by this legislation. To cite a few examples, deferred prosecutions are now available as a dispositional tool
in all cases,1 an accused generally must be tried within 6 months
from the entry of a not guilty plea, 2 the complex problems of
multiple prosecutions and double jeopardy have been codified
by statute, 3 and a bifurcated trial for class 1 felonies has been
established. 4
However, a broad-scale statutory revision which abandons
many long-accepted concepts of the criminal law is bound to
create problems of interpretation, at least until such time as
judicial construction resolves the competing alternatives. Nevertheless, the inevitability of conflicts in interpretation only increases the need for statutory coherency in definition. Since
the Criminal Code expressly recognizes as two of its basic purposes the adequate definition of the act and mental state constituting each offense, and the concomitant warning to all persons of the nature of the prohibited conduct and its penalties, 5
it is proper to question whether the Code has achieved these
purposes in its treatment of criminal homicides.
Much has been written over the years with respect to
the mental element in crime and the problem of defining
criminal culpability in a manner reflective of the real differ*Attorney at Law, Denver, Colorado; A.B., St. Peter's College, 1957;

LL.B., Rutgers Law School, 1961.
Ch. 44, § 1, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-7-401 (1973)).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-505 (Supp. 1971).
3 Id. §§ 40-1-402 to -404.
4 Ch. 44, § 1, [19721 Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-11-103 (1973)).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-102(1) (Supp. 1971).
1

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

ences in moral turpitude for criminal acts.' The purpose of this
article is not to add to the academic discussion of these issues.
Rather, the purpose is to analyze, within the definitional confines established by the Criminal Code, the essential elements
of culpability for the various types of criminal homicides and
to delineate the salient problems and changes created by this
statute.
I.

FIRST DEGREE MURDER

At common law, murder was defined as the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice prepense or aforethought.There were no degrees of murder at common law, and the
factor of malice was the essential ingredient distinguishing
murder from other types of criminal homicide." Malice included something more than an intent to kill or endanger a
human life; it was a condition of mind manifesting wickedness,
depravity and malignancy.' The concept of "aforethought" signified the formation in and by the mind of the intent to do
the evil act in advance of the act itself, and connoted the
notions of thought, reflection, design, and purpose. 10 Thus,
"malice aforethought" included implicitly the concepts of premeditation and deliberation."
In 1861, the Colorado legislature enacted into statute the
crime of murder, classified murder into two degrees, and
adopted much of the then existing common law pertaining to
it. 1 2 Under Colorado law, murder in the first degree was the
unlawful killing of a human being with express malice aforethought."3 Express malice was defined as the "deliberate in6E.g.,

G. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME (1965); Perkins, A
Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARv. L. REV. 905 (1939); Perkins, A ReExamination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537 (1934); Prevezer,
The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 624 (1957); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of
the Law of Homicide: I & II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 1261 (1937).
7 F. WHARTON, THE LAW OF HOMICiDE § 2 (3d ed. 1907).
8 Id.

9Id. § 81.
lo Id. § 82.
11Id.; see, e.g., Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436 (1872). At common law, premeditation meant to plan, contrive, or scheme beforehand. F. WHARTON,
supra note 7, § 114. Deliberation meant that the manner of the homicide
was determined after examination and reflection, that is, that the consequences, chances, and means were weighed, carefully considered, and
estimated. Id., § 112.
12 Section 18, [1861] Colo. Sess. Laws 292. The murder statute was expanded in 1883 to encompass specific acts of homicide which were
deemed murder in the first degree. Section 20, [1883] Colo. Sess. Laws
150.
13 Section 18, [1883] Colo. Sess. Laws 149 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-1 (1963)); Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 525, 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).
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tention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature
which is manifested by external circumstances capable of
proof." 4 By statute, murder in the first degree encompassed
those homicides "perpetrated by a deliberate and premeditated
killing;" those homicides perpetrated by an "act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and indicating a depraved mind,
regardless of human life," and those killings perpetrated from
a "deliberate and premeditated design, unlawfully and maliciously, to effect the death of a person other than the one who
is killed."'15 In the case of certain acts, such as a homicide perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, torture, or in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate certain felonies, proof of
express malice aforethought was not necessary. Stated in another
fashion, the nature of the acts themselves constituted conclusive proof of express malice aforethought.10
Under section 40-3-102 (1) of the Criminal Code, first degree
murder is a class 1 felony and a person is guilty thereof if
he acts in any of the four following ways:
(a) With premeditated intent to cause the death of a person
other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of another person; or
(b) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
rape, or any sexual offense prohibited by sections 40-3-402, 403-403, or 40-3-404, and in the course of or in furtherance of that
crime that he is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of
the participants, is caused; or
(c) By perjury or subornation of perjury he procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person; or
(d) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life, he intentionally engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to a person other than him17
self, and thereby causes the death of another.
14 Section 19, [1861] Colo. Sess. Laws 292 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §

40-2-2 (1963)).
1"Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)).
11;
E.g., Early v. People, 142 Colo. 463, 352 P.2d 112 (1960); Dickens v.
People, 67 Colo. 409, 186 P. 277 (1919); Ehrhardt v. People, 51 Colo. 205,
117 P. 164 (1911) ; Andrews v. People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 P. 1031 (1905).
17 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102(1) (Supp. 1971). As capital punishment has been held to be unconstitutional, there will be no more executions. Furman v. Georgia, 40 U.S.L.W. 4923 (U.S. June 27, 1972). Consequently, crimes under part (c) of this statute are now an impossibility.
In subsections (a) and (d) the statute expressly recognizes the
principle of transferred intent. Under this principle, the offender is
guilty of first degree murder even if the perzon killed is not the person
the offender intended to kill, so long as the offender otherwise had the
mental state which characterizes murder under the statute. See Henwood v. People, 54 Colo. 188, 129 P. 1010 (1913); Ryan v. People, 50
Colo. 99, 114 P. 306 (,1911); 1 R. ANDERSoN, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 193 (1957).
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In the case of class 1 felonies, provision is made for a
separate trial on the issue of penalty before the same jury after
a guilty verdict is returned.18 At the penalty trial, the jury is
authorized to return a verdict of death or life imprisonment,
or a verdict recommending leniency, in which case the court
may impose a sentence of 15 years to life. Recently, in Furman
v. Georgia,19 the United States Supreme Court declared capital
punishment unconstitutional. The practical and immediate effect of this decision is to render nugatory that portion of the
Criminal Code making death an alternative penalty for first
degree murder. Consequently, the penalties for first degree
murder are now either life imprisonment, or, in the case where
leniency is indicated, imprisonment for a period of 15 years to
life.
The bifurcated trial section of the Criminal Code was enacted primarily to alleviate the dilemma inherent in capital
cases where the jury passes on the issue of culpability and
punishment in the same proceeding. It has long been recognized
that so long as capital punishment can be imposed, the accused
should have the opportunity of testifying about facts in mitigation in an effort to save his life without running the risk
of simultaneously incriminating himself on the issue of guilt.
With the judicial abolition of capital punishment, however, the
primary reason for the bifurcated trial ceases to exist, and the
issue of penalty (i.e., life imprisonment or leniency justifying
a 15 year to life sentence) can just as effectively be resolved
in a unitary proceeding. However, the only provision in the
Criminal Code which provides for a leniency verdict in the
case of first degree murder is the bifurcated trial provision.
The general penalty section of the Criminal Code provides
alternative penalties of death or life imprisonment for class 1
felonies. Therefore, until such time as the Criminal Code is
amended, the bifurcated trial on penalty should probably be
utilized in the case of a conviction for first degree murder so
as not to deprive the accused of his right to have the jury
determine the propriety of a leniency verdict. If the legislature
desires to amend the statute and do away with the bifurcated
trial entirely because of the abolition of capital punishment, it
can do so by providing for a unitary proceeding on guilt and
penalty, the alternatives of penalty being life imprisonment or
leniency.
18 Ch. 44, § 1, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN.

§ 39-11-103 (1973)).

1940 U.S.L.W. 4923 (U.S. June 27, 1972).
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A.

Premeditated Intent to Cause Death

Since the concept of express malice encompasses such overlapping ingredients as premeditation, deliberation, depravity of
mind, and intent to kill, the Criminal Code follows the example
of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and eliminates malice from the definition of murder. 20 However, the
Criminal Code, contrary to the Model Penal Code, retains the
concepts of premeditation and intent, and makes premeditation
unique to the crime of first degree murder. 21 The Colorado
Criminal Code defines premeditation as "a design formed to
do something at any time before it is done. ' 22 Additionally,
under the Criminal Code, "[a] person acts intentionally with
respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute . . .
when his conscious object is to cause that result, or engage in
that conduct, or when his actions are such as to give rise to
23
a substantial certainty that such results will be produced.1
Thus, murder in the first degree under section 40-3-102(1) (a)
requires two distinct elements of mental culpability: (a) there
must be a premeditation to perform the act causing death; (b)
there must be an intent to cause the death of a person killed
or another person.
The legislature obviously intended the concept of premeditation to be a crucial element in distinguishing that form
of first degree murder requiring "premeditated intent to cause
death" from second degree murder. This difference is made
clear because one form of second degree murder is defined
as causing the death of a person intentionally, but without
premeditation..2 4 With such a legislative distinction, it cannot
reasonably be argued that the use of the word "premeditated"
in the definition of first degree murder was merely superfluous
and unnecessary to its definition.
The major source

of difficulty in the Criminal Code's

MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) provides as follows:
[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(a) It is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) It is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such
recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, or flight after committing robbery, rape by force
or intimidation, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious
escape.
(Supp. 1971).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102 (a)
22 Id. § 40-3-101 (1) (c).
23 Id. § 40-1-601(6).
24 Id. § 40-3-103 (1) (a).
20
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treatment of first degree murder is the retention of the concepts of both premeditation and intent. The Model Penal Code
several years ago recognized the unwieldy nature of such concepts and attempted to dispel their obscurity by rationalizing
the culpability requirements in criminal law under the concepts of knowledge and purpose.2" The Colorado Criminal Code,
however, retains premeditation and intent, and then defines
intent by employing part of the Model Penal Code's definition
of knowledge and part of its definition of purpose. 26 As a result,
the Criminal Code fails to classify degrees of mental culpability
on the basis of clearly distinguishable psychological states.
Justice Cardozo in 1928 recognized the false psychology
upon which the legal distinction between premeditation and
intent is predicated:
I think the distinction is much too vague to be continued in
our law. There can be no intent unless there is a choice, yet by
the hypothesis, the choice without more is enough to justify the
inference that the intent was . . . premeditated.

The presence

of a sudden impulse is said to mark the dividing line, but how can
an impulse be anything but sudden when the time for its for25 MODEL PENAL

CODE

§ 2.02 (2)

(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)

provides as

follows:

6

(2)

Kinds of culpability defined.

(a)

Purposely.

A person acts purposely with respect to a material element
of an offense when:
(1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct
of that nature or to cause such a result; and
if the element involves the attendant circumstances,
(2)
he knows of the existence of such circumstances.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct
or the attendant circumstances, he knows that his conduct is
of that nature or he knows of the existence of such circumstances; and
(2) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he
knows that his conduct will necessarily cause such a result
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(6) (Supp. 1971), extracts the "conscious object" language from the Model Penal Code's definition of purposely, and the "knowledge of results" language, with some variation,
from the Model Penal Code's definition of knowingly. See note 25 supra.
After having transposed much of the Model Penal Code's meaning of
knowledge and purpose to the Criminal Code's concept of intent, the
Criminal Code then employs the concept of knowledge under separate
definition. Thus, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(7) (Supp. 1971)
provides:

A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when
he is aware, or reasonably should be aware, that his conduct is
of that nature or that the circumstance exists.
This definition is almost identical to the Model Penal Code's definition
of knowledge in § 2.02(2) (b). See note 25 supra.
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mation is measured by the lapse of seconds? Yet the decisions
are to the effect that seconds may be enough. What is meant, as
I understand it, is that the impulse must be the product of an
emotion or passion so swift and overmastering as to sweep the
mind from its moorings. A metaphor, however, is, to say the
least, a shifting test whereby to measure degrees of guilt that
mean the difference between life and death. I think the students
of the mind should make it clear to the lawmakers that the
statute is framed along the lines of a defective and unreal
psychology.2 7

Because these definitions do not reflect actual differing states
of mind, it becomes impossible to apply the statutes with any
degree of precision. A close analysis of the language makes this
clear. Under the Criminal Code's general definition of intention,
intention in the case of murder would be the conscious object
to cause death or the conscious object to engage in an act of
killing, or acting with substantial certainty that death will be
2produced..
' The very minimum requirement of culpability for
an intentional act is "the performance of conduct involving a
voluntary act."'1 A voluntary act, by statutory definition, is "an
act performed consciously as a result of effort or determination. '' 3 1 It is well established in psychology that consciousness
implies a state of awareness. 3 ' Under the Criminal Code, second
degree murder is an intentional killing, thereby requiring that
the actor be aware of his object or purpose in acting. 32 In
differentiating between second and first degree murder, it is
necessary to distinguish between taking a life while aware that
one is so doing (second degree murder) and taking a life as a
result of "a design formed to do something at any time before
it is done ' 3 3 (first degree murder).
Apparently, if there is a difference between first and second degree murder, it is a result of added time and planning in
the case of first degree murder. However, prior Colorado case
law specifically rejects such a distinction. In the much cited
case of Van Houton v. People, the court stated:
Time, however, is not essential if there was a design and
determination to kill formed in the mind of the defendant previous to or at the time the mortal wound was given. It matters
27

B.

CARDOZO, LAW AND LIrERATURE

28 COLO. REV.
2"
30
31

STAT.

ANN.

97-99 (1931).

§ 40-1-601(6)

(Supp. 1971).

Id. § 40-1-602.
Id. § 40-1-601(2) (emphasis added).
E.g., H. ENGLISH & A. ENGLISH, A COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOANALYTICAL TERMS 58 (1958); 1 R. GOLDENSON, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR: PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND MENTAL HEALTH 250-53 (1970); cf. Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879).

32

See p. 154 infra.

33 COLO. REV.

STAT. ANN.

§ 40-3-101 (1)

(c)

(Supp. 1971).
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not how short the interval, if it was sufficient for one thought to
follow another, and the defendant actually deliberated and premeditated upon such design before firing the fatal shot, this was
34
sufficient to raise the crime to the highest grade known to law.

Clearly, if one has time to be aware of the consequences of
an action there has been time for "one thought to follow another." Thus, if one has the requisite mental culpability for
second degree murder, one also has the requisite mental culpability for first degree murder.
Viewing the problem in the terms of the statute itself, it
is possible to argue that acting with a conscious object to cause
a result (the definition of intention) involves an awareness
which at least implicitly includes a prior design to act (the
definition of premeditation). And so, in the case of first degree
murder, it can be argued that voluntarily acting with a conscious object or purpose to cause death involves, by psychological necessity, a prior design to act in a manner calculated to
cause death, to the very extent that one is conscious or aware
of his object or purpose. Thus, under such an argument, any
difference between a killing accompanied by a prior design to
cause death (premeditation), and a killing accompanied by a
conscious object to cause death (intention), would be so vague
and obscure that a person of ordinary intelligence could not
know with fair assurance the nature of the distinction.
The legislative choice of such an unwieldy concept as "premeditated intent" and the legislative selection of premeditation
as the crucial element in distinguishing one form of first degree
murder from second degree murder raises some serious questions of construction. It has been held that a statute which
forbids "the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due
process of law."'35 For such a statute virtually "licenses the
jury to create its own standard in each case," and no more
proof is required for a conviction under one statute than under
the other.3 6 Additionally, equal protection of law requires that
a statutory classification be based on differences which are real
34 Van Houton v. People, 22 Colo. 53, 66, 43 P. 137 (1895).
35 See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. Gen-

eral Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); People v. Vinnolla, 494
P.2d 826 (Colo. 1972); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 280, 450 P.2d 1013
(1969); Fehringer v. People, 59 Colo. 3, 147 P. 361 (1915).
36 See cases cited note 35 supra. See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
263 (1937); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 COLO. L. REv. 455 (1971).
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in fact and reasonably related to the legitimate statutory pur3
poseY.
Thus, where two separate statutes with unequal penalties proscribe what ostensibly might be different acts, but the
statutes offer no intelligent standards for distinguishing the
acts proscribed, then equal protection is violated. 38 The problems of statutory construction inherent in such concepts as
"premeditated intent" and "intent without premeditation" could
have been avoided by a more carefully selected basis for dis39
tinguishing between different degrees of criminal culpability.
B.

Felony-Murder

At common law, an accidental or unintentional homicide
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a felony
was murder. 40 The rule was rationalized on the basis of a
fiction: the malice necessary to make the killing murder could
37E.g., Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970). See also
Spillers v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Chavez, 77
N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966); State v. Pirkey, 203 Ore. 697, 281 P.2d 698
(1955).
38 See cases cited note 37 supra. Even where certain conduct fits within
two different statutory proscriptions, which carry different penalties but
set forth distinct legal elements for the statutory offenses, one body of
law would require that the accused be proscuted under the less severe
statute. State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969); State v.
Collins, 55 Wash. 2d 469, 348 P.2d 214 (1960); Comment, Prosecutorial
Discretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 COLO. L. REV. 155
(1971). However, the Colorado Supreme Court recently indicated in
dicta that the prosecutor has discretion in such a situation to proceed
under either statute. People v. James, 497 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1972). In
the James case, however, the Court found that the statutes in question
(forgery and unlawful use of credit device) related to two different
kinds of criminal conduct, and the classifications were not unintelligible.
39 Perhaps some degree of definitional consistency and coherency can be
salvaged from the Criminal Code by construing "premeditation" in a
manner calculated to accomplish what the legislature intended but did
not quite achieve - to establish legally qualitative distinctions between
first and second degree murder reflective of the real differences in
moral turpitude for homicidal acts. The Criminal Code not only states
that it shall be construed in such manner as to define adequately the
act and mental state which constitutes each offense, but also expressly
sanctions the use of case law as an interpretive aid in the construction
of its provisions. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-104(3) (Supp. 1971).
It is a fact that in some cases judicial construction of the traditional
concepts of homicide (such as premeditation, deliberation, wilfulness,
malice) has resulted in practically interpreting them out of existence.
Prior case law, while not furnishing an ideal solution by any means,
affords a less shaky basis for delineatirig the mental culpability requirements of first degree murder than does the literal application of the
Criminal Code. In the case of premeditated intent, construction might
be sought in the former culpability requirement of first degree murder,
express malice aforethought. Thus, "premeditated intent" might be construed to mean a design to engage in the act of killing, calmly or
sedately formed prior to the act itself, accompanied by a consciously
evil desire or object to bring about death. See F. WHARTON, supra note
7, §§ 81, 82. While this construction of premeditation virtually reinstates much of the admittedly elusive language of the common law, it is
at least somewhat more intelligible than the literal definition of premeditated intent in the Criminal Code. Certainly, murder should be
defined by something other than the statutory tautologies presently
inherent in the Criminal Code.
40 F. WHARTON, supra note 7, § 92.
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be constructively imputed from the malice incident to the perpetration of the initial felony. 41 One possible explanation of this
doctrine is that at early common law, practically all felonies
were punishable by death, so it made little difference whether
the accused was hanged for the initial felony or for the death
42
accidentally resulting from the felony.
Prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code, Colorado's felonymurder statute proscribed as first degree murder all killing
"committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, mayhem or burglary. '43 Although the majority of states have similar statutes, courts in several jurisdictions have imposed various qualifications on the felony-murder
44
rule in an effort to limit its application.
There are two basic conditions precedent to the application
of the felony-murder rule under the Criminal Code. Initially,
there must be an actual commission or attempt to commit one
of the designated felonies -arson,
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, rape, gross sexual imposition, deviate sexual intercourse
by force or its equivalent, or deviate sexual intercourse by imposition. Secondly, the statute requires that, after the attempt
or commission of the designated felony has commenced, the
death of another be caused in the course of or in furtherance
of the designated felony.
Under the plain meaning of the statute, an accidental
homicide committed in the course of conduct which is clearly
preparatory in nature would not be within the ambit of the
41 Id. See also Frady v. People, 96 Colo. 43, 40 P.2d 606 (1934); Andrews
v. People, 33 Colo. 193, 69 P. 1031 (1905).
42
Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472, 476, (1958).
43 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-2 (1963)).
44 Some of the judicially created limitations are as follows: (1) The felonious act must be dangerous to life. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199
N.W. 373 (1924); State v. Diebold, 152 Wash. 68, 277 P. 394 (1929).
(2) The homicide must be the natural and probable consequence of the
felonious act. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735
(1901). (3) Death must be proximately caused. Burton v. State, 122
Tex. Crim. 363, 55 S.W.2d 813 (1933). (4) The felony must be malum
in se. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924). (5) The
act must be a common law felony. State v. Burrell, 120 N.J.L. 277,
199 A. 18 (1938); Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 A. 968 (1914).
(6) The period during which the felony is in the process of commission
must be narrowly construed. State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 139 So. 463
(1932); Huggins v. State, 149 Miss. 280, 115 So. 213 (1928); People v.
Smith, 232 N.Y. 239, 133 N.E. 574 (1921); State v. Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382,
125 N.E. 535 (1919); State v. Diebold, 152 Wash. 68, 277 P. 394 (1929).
(7)The underlying felony must be independent of the homicide. State v.
Severns, 158 Kan. 453, 148 P.2d 488 (1944); State v. Fisher, 120 Kan.
226, 243 P. 291 (1926); State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552 (1878); People v.
Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927); People v. Huther, 184 N.Y. 237,
77 N.E. 6 (1906).
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felony-murder rule. Although such conduct might arguably be
construed to be in furtherance of the criminal episode itself,
conduct in the form of preparation has traditionally been considered as falling short of the criminal attempt.4 5 However, the
Criminal Code's definition of attempt is sufficiently broad to
encompass conduct which formerly fell within the area of noncriminal preparation. The definition of attempt, which is similar to the Model Penal Code's definition of attempt, is intentional conduct "constituting a substantial step towards the
commission of an offense. '' 4 6 A substantial step is further defined by the Colorado Criminal Code as "conduct, whether act,
omission, or possession, which is strongly corroborative of the
firmness of the actor's intent to complete the commission of
the offense. '47 While the Criminal Code fails to specifically
characterize the type of conduct which does or does not constitute a substantial step, the Model Penal Code furnishes some
illustrative definitions which might arguably be within the
Criminal Code's general definition of attempt. The Model Penal
Code provides that the following conduct, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not, as a matter of
law, be held insufficient to constitute a substantial step:
(a)

lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated

victim of the crime;
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of
the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission;
(c)

reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission

of the crime;
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which
it is contemplated that the crime will be committed;

(e)

possession of materials to be employed in the commission

of the crime, which are specifically designed for such unlawful

use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under
the circumstances;
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection

or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the
circumstances;
(g) soliciting an innocent agent
to engage in conduct constitut48
ing an element of the crime.
Thus, a person who is armed with a deadly weapon and
45 E.g., Lewis v. People, 124 Colo. 62, 235 P.2d 348 (1951); People v. Mur-

ray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 162 Pa. Super. 526, 58
A. 375 (1948); Regina v. Cheeseman, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 100 (Crim. App.
1862).
46 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-101 (Supp. 1971). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
47
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-101 (Supp. 1971).
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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is driving to the scene of a robbery and kills another in a
motor vehicle accident en route, arguably falls within the
definition of attempted robbery. Since an attempt under the
Colorado Criminal Code includes possessory conduct, 49 and the
possession of a deadly weapon is corroborative of the actor's
intent to complete the offense,10 a court could hold that such
conduct under the circumstances is sufficient to constitute attempted robbery and thereby render the actor liable for first
degree murder under the felony-murder rule.
The Colorado Criminal Code expressly broadens the scope
of the felony-murder rule to include immediate flight from
the scene of the crime.' In this respect, the statute follows the
holding of Whitman v. People,'52 which upheld the defendant's
conviction for first degree murder under the former felonymurder statute for the death of an occupant of a motor vehicle
with which the defendant collided while fleeing from the scene
of a robbery. However, the precise scope of the phrase "immediate flight" will undoubtedly require judicial construction.
The death of one of the participants in the underlying
felony is expressly taken out of the felony-murder rule under
the Criminal Code. 53 In this respect, the Criminal Code nullifies the case of Robbins v. People,'54 which upheld Robbins'
felony-murder conviction for his accidental killing of a co-felon
during the course of a robbery. Under the Criminal Code,
whether the participant be killed by the victim of the robbery,
the police, or some third party, the co-participants are not
criminally responsible for his death. The rationale for this limitation lies in the fact that the killing of the participant was justifiable under the circumstances. It would be irrational to impute a legally justifiable homicide to a participating felon and,
by reason of such imputation, change the character of the act
5
from one of justifiable homicide to one of criminal culpability.However, if the participant himself intentionally, recklessly,
or negligently causes the death of a co-participant during the
felony or immediate flight therefrom, then ostensibly he could

49 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

so Id.
51Id. § 40-3-102(1) (b).

§ 40-2-101 (1)

(Supp. 1971).

52 161 Colo. 110, 420 P.2d 416 (1966).
.4

§ 40-3-102(1) (b)
142 Colo. 254, 350 P.2d 818 (1960).

55

See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others,

53COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.

105 U. PA. L. REv. 50 (1956).

(Supp. 1971).
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be held to the appropriate degree of criminal liability independent of the felony-murder statute.5 6
One of the most perplexing problems in the felony-murder area is not expressly resolved by the Criminal Code. The
problem is whether or not a participant in a crime can be
held criminally responsible under the felony-murder doctrine
for the death of a third party effected by a nonparticipant.
Certainly in the case where the participant uses the body of
an innocent person as a shield in order to escape from the
scene of the crime, and the innocent person is killed by police
bullets, the participant, even independent of the felony-murder
rule, would be liable for first degree murder by virtue of the
criminal culpability demonstrated in the use of the body of
the innocent person.5 7 But in the case where the participants
of a robbery are fleeing from the scene of the crime and a
policeman or the victim of the robbery shoots at their fleeing
automobile and accidentally kills an innocent bystander, the
question of whether the participants are criminally liable for
first degree murder under the felony-murder doctrine is not
so easily answered. The Criminal Code merely states that a
person commits the crime of first degree murder if, "in the
course of or in furtherance of the crime . . . or of immediate
flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the
participants, is caused.15 8 But the Criminal Code contains no
definition of causation. The causality relationship between conduct and result in criminal law has been analyzed from many
cause, direct cause, substantial cause,
perspectives -proximate
efficient cause, and so forth. '9 The Model Penal Code undertakes a fresh approach to the issue of causation by establishing
a "but-for" test, with the qualification that in offenses requiring
5 Thus, the participant could possibly be prosecuted for any of the following: first degree murder, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102 (Supp.
1971), on the ground that he had the "premeditated intent to cause
death" or he intentionally engaged in an act which created a grave risk
of death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life; second degree murder, id. § 40-3-103, on the
ground that he caused the death intentionally or with intent to cause
serious bodily injury; manslaughter, id. § 40-3-104, on the ground that
he caused the death recklessly, or perhaps in the exceptional situation,
he caused the death intentionally upon heat of passion; criminally negligent homicide, id. § 40-3-105, on the ground that he caused the death
by criminal negligence; and finally for vehicular homicide, id. § 40-3106, if he proximately caused the death while driving under the influence or in a reckless manner.
57See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934); Taylor v.
State, 40 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900).
58 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102(1) (b) (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
supra note 17, § 195; F.
27-39; Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 589 (1970).

5 See R. ANDERSON,

WHARTON,

supra note 7, §§
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purpose or knowledge with respect to a particular result, criminal culpability is generally established only when the actual
result was within the purpose or contemplation of the actor.6 0
Since the Colorado Criminal Code expressly sanctions the
use of case law as an interpretive aid in the construction of
its provisions, 61 an answer to the problem of a participant's
responsibility for the death of a third party effected by a
nonparticipant might be found at common law. At common law
the felony-murder rule was used to establish the mens rea of
murder. The rule imputed to all the perpetrators of the felony
the malice required for murder, once it was established that
a death was criminally caused by one of the perpetrators in
furtherance of the felony.62 But the felony-murder rule was
not a rule of imputed causation. At common law the felonymurder rule required a direct causal connection between the
perpetration of the felony and the ensuing homicide.6 3 Mere
temporal coincidence of the felony and the death of another
was insufficient to establish felony-murder liability. 64 The rationale of the common law was elucidated in the early case of
Commonwealth v. Campbell:
No person can be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either
actually or constructively his, and it cannot be his act in either
sense unless committed by his own hand or by someone acting
in concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or
purpose. Certainly that cannot be said to be an act of a party
in any just sense, or on any sound legal principle, which is not
only not done by him, or anyone with whom he is associated or
connected in a common enterprise, or in attempting to accomplish
the same end, but is committed by a person who is his direct and
immediate adversary, and who is, at the moment when the alleged criminal act is done, actually engaged in opposing and resisting him and his confederates and abettors in the accomplish65
ment of the unlawful object for which they are united.

Several jurisdictions passing on the issue have followed
the common law rule that the act of killing must be by the
felon or his confederate. 66 As one court recently stated, "[A]
60MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
61
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-104(3) (Supp. 1971).

62 Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.
PA. L. REv. 50, 59 (1956).
63 Perkins, The Law of Homicide, 36 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 391, 404 (1946);
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863); Rex v.
Plummer, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (K.B. 1700). See also the discussion in Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 372 (1958).
64
Perkins, supra note 63.
65 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863).
66 Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); State v.
Garner, 238 La. 563, 115 So. 2d 855 (1959); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349
Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); Podolski v. People, 332 Mich. 508, 52
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distinction based on the person killed . . . would make the defendant's criminal liability turn upon the marksmanship of
victims and policemen," and a "rule of law cannot reasonably
be based on such a fortuitous circumstance."' 67 Since the Colorado legislature saw fit to retain the felony-murder rule, it
should have delineated the scope of the rule by either defining
the concept of causation or articulating within the felony-murder
statute the bounds of its applicability.
One final change effected by the Criminal Code is the
establishment of an affirmative defense to the charge of felonymurder. The Criminal Code provides that if the defendant presents some credible evidence on his affirmative defense, "then
the guilt of the defendant must be established beyond a reasonable doubt as to the issues underlying the affirmative defense
as well as all other elements of the offense. ' 68 The six factors
on which the defendant must present some credible evidence
to raise the affirmative defense are as follows: (1) that he "was
not the only participant in the underlying crime;" and (2)
that he "did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit,
request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission
thereof;" and (3) that he "was not armed with a deadly weapon;" and (4) that he "had no reasonable ground to believe
that any other participant was armed with such a weapon
or instrument;" and (5) that he "did not engage in or intend
to engage in and had no reasonable ground to believe that any
other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury;" and (6) that he "endeavored to disengage himself from the commission of the
underlying crime or flight therefrom immediately upon having
reasonable grounds to believe that another participant [was]
armed with a deadly weapon, instrument, article, or substance
or intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or
serious bodily injury. '"69 The affirmative defense section seems
to be predicated on the assumption that the death of the victim was caused by one of the participants in the felony itself.
One might reasonably argue from the thrust of this section
that the legislature intended to restrict the application of the
felony-murder rule to deaths directly caused by one of the
N.W.2d 201 (1952); People v. Wood, 9 App. Div. 443, 195 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1955).
67 People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 780, 402 P.2d 130, 132, 614 Cal. Rptr.
442, 444 (1965).
68
CoLo. REv.

STAT. ANN.

G9 Id. § 40-3-102(2).

§ 40-1-507 (Supp. 1971).
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participants in the felony itself, as opposed to a nonparticipant.
Judicial construction will undoubtedly be required to resolve
the scope of the felony-murder rule under the statute.
Murder by Extreme Indifference to Human Life
At common law, the requisite of malice for murder included not only an intent to kill or endanger a particular person, but also "every case where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences,
and a mind regardless of social duty, although no particular
person may be intended to be injured. '70 The former Colorado
murder statute recognized this principle by proscribing as first
degree murder death resulting from an act "greatly dangerous
to the lives of others and indicating a depraved mind, regardless
of human life."' 71 Colorado case law restricted the application
of this section to those acts evincing "universal malice," as
opposed to acts directed at the person actually killed:
Every act that results in the death of a person is greatly dangerous to the life of such pelson, but the statute intended that
there should be an act which shows the accused to have had a
depraved mind, regardless of human life, and is intended to include those cases where a person has no deliberate intention to
kill any particular individual. In other words, when a person
kills another by an act which is greatly dangerous to the lives
of others, and which shows a depraved mind regardless of human
life, he is guilty of murder in the first degree, not because he has
atrociously murdered a particular individual, but because his act
has evinced universal malice, a malice against mankind in
general.
C.

We think the Legislature, in this clause, intended to
raise to the high grade of murder in the first degree those homicides which are the result of what is called "universal malice."
By universal malice, we do not mean a malicious purpose to
take the life of all persons. It is that depravity of the human
heart, which determines to take life upon slight or insufficient
72
provocation, without knowing or caring who may be the victim.
The Criminal Code attempts to codify this concept of universal malice by providing in section 40-3-102 (1) (d) that "a
person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if
[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life, he intentionally engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to a person other than himself,
73
and thereby causes the death of another."
70 F. WHARTON, supra note 7, § 90.
71 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)).
72
Longinotti v. People, 46 Colo. 173, 176, 180, 102 P. 165, 166, 168 (1909).
73 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-3-102(1) (d)

(Supp. 1971).
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There are two essential elements of culpability under this
section: (1) the actor must intentionally perform an act creating a substantial homicidal risk; and (2) the act itself must
be performed under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. The intent requisite for culpability under
this section does not require a conscious object to cause death,
or a premeditated intent to cause death. That type of mental
culpability is an ingredient of murder under section 41-3-102(1)
(a). Considering the Criminal Code's general definition of intent,7 4 the intent contemplated in subsection (1) (d) is either
of the following: (1) the actor's conscious object is to engage
in that particular conduct; or (2) his actions are such as to
give rise to a substantial certainty that death will result from
them. The latter definition of intentional conduct constitutes
a virtual imputation of intent to the actor regardless of whether
or not the fatal results of his conduct are within his conscious
object or purpose, and regardless of whether or not he actually
intends to engage in death-causing conduct. This imputation of
intent requires that the actions create such a risk-endangering
situation that the results are almost certain to follow from the
act, regardless of the purpose or specific intent of the actor
himself. In other words, the act speaks for itself. In this respect,
intent becomes a form of aggravated recklessness. Under the
Criminal Code one acts recklessly when he is aware or reasonably should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and
consciously disregards the risk in a manner amounting to will75
ful and wanton conduct.
But murder in the first degree under this subsection requires, in addition to intentionally engaging in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death, that the act itself must be performed "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life." It has been argued that the adjective "extreme" is misplaced because there are no degrees
of indifference to a particular result. In other words, "to speak
of extreme indifference is pointless, because indifference itself
is the ultimate extremity. '' 71 Also, it might be argued that
when one intentionally engages in conduct which creates a great
risk of death to another, he thereby acts under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Under such an argument, the "extreme indifference" require4 Id. §40-1-601 (6).
75

Id. §40-1-601 (8).

76 G.

WILLIAMS,

supra note 6.
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ment would add nothing to the culpability requirement of first
degree murder. However, the legislature obviously did not
intend to proscribe as first degree murder any and all acts
creating substantial homicidal risks to others where the actor's
conscious object is to engage in the act but he is indifferent to
the result, or where the actor's conduct gives rise to a high
probability of death but death is not intended. If such were
the legislative intent, then this particular form of first degree
murder would be almost impossible to distinguish from manslaughter, which is defined as recklessly causing the death
77
of another person.
The further requirement that the conduct itself be performed "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life" seems to reflect the legislative
judgment that certain types of criminal conduct resulting in
death are qualitatively distinct from a consciously performed
act resulting in an unintended death and an act performed in
conscious disregard of a substantial and an unjustifiable risk
of death. Although the basis for this distinction is extremely
difficult to verbalize, it would seem that the additional requirement of extreme indifference to life assimilates that type of
conscious indifference to consequences which approaches, but
does not quite meet, purposeful and knowing conduct.75 Examples of the proscribed conduct would include shooting into
a crowd or an occupied house or an occupied automobile, in
disregard of any and all consequences.71 Section 40-3-102 (d)
thus reflects, and somewhat broadens, the common law principle of universal malice and the former statutory proscription
cast in terms of "a depraved heart regardless of human life. '" 0
II.

SECOND DEGREE MURDER

Under prior Colorado law, second degree murder was the
unlawful killing of a human being without premeditation or
deliberation but with implied malice." Malice was implied
when there was no considerable provocation for the killing,
or where the circumstances of the killing showed an aban77 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
8

7 See MODEL PENAL CODE

§

(a)

(Supp. 1971).
§ 201.2 and Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
40-3-104(1)

7' Wechsler & Michael, supra note 6, at 709-13, 720-22, 742-51.

80 Id.; Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-2-3(1) (1963)).
81 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)). See, e.g., Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204 (Colo.
1972); Watkins v. People, 158 Colo. 485, 408 P.2d 425 (1965); Becksted v.
People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956); Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563,
9 P. 853 (1885).
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doned and malignant heart on the part of the slayer.8 2 In the
context of second degree murder, "abandoned" meant throwing off all self-restraint and pursuing a lawless and evil course
with utter disregard to the consequences;83 "malignant" was
defined as governed by malice, not necessarily towards a particular individual, but under circumstances showing an utter
disregard for human life proceeding from a heart devoid of
social duty and fatally bent on mischief.84 The distinguishing
elements between first and second degree murder were found
in the concepts of premeditation and deliberation, or specific
intent to kill.85 Murder in the second degree was not a specific
intent crime and accordingly did not require a specific intent
to kill.8" For example, the unjustified shooting at another with
a gun would not, standing alone, constitute murder in the
first degree, although the act would be sufficient to imply
malice for second degree murder. 87 In crimes of general intent,
a person was presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts.8 8 Thus, a person of sound mind who
did not intend to kill would be responsible, nevertheless, for
second degree murder so long as he intended to perform the
physical act resulting in death and the act itself was not otherwise legally justified.
The Criminal Code substantially changes the previously
existing definition of second degree murder by providing as
follows in section 40-3-103:
(1) A person commits the crime of murder in the second
degree if: (a) He causes the death of a person intentionally,
but without premeditation; or (b) With intent to cause serious
bodily injury to a person other than himself, he causes the death
of that person or of another person.8S
82 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)).
83 McAndrews v. People, 71 Colo. 542, 553, 208 P. 486, 490 (1922).
84 Id.
85 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)). See, e.g., Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204 (Colo.
1972); Watkins v. People, 158 Colo. 485, 408 P.2d 425 (1965); Becksted v.
People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956); Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563,
9 P. 853 (1885).
86 Ch. 64, § 2, [1901] Colo. Sess. Laws 153 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-3(1) (1963)).
87 Id.
ssE.g., Keller v. People, 153 Colo. 590, 387 P.2d 421 (1963); R. ANDERSON,
supra note 17, §§ 60-61.
S' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-103 (Supp. 1971). Second degree murder,
a class 2 felony, carrying a sentence of not less than 10 nor more
than 50 years, is a lesser included offense of those types of first degree
murder requiring "'premeditated intent to cause death" and intentional
conduct "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life." Id. § 40-1-508(5) (c) provides:
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The dilemma created by the Criminal Code's underlying
assumption that one can act intentionally but without a prior
design to act (premeditation) has been discussed within the
context of first degree murder. But even assuming arguendo
that one can act intentionally but without premeditation, the
Criminal Code creates a significant definitional change in second degree murder by requiring as an essential element of
culpability the specific intent to cause death or to cause serious
bodily injury. Thus, within the context of the Criminal Code's
definition of intent,"" second degree murder requires or e of the
following mental states: (1) a conscious object to cau
death
or serious bodily injury; (2) a conscious object to ei. _ge in
death-causing conduct or seriously-injuring conduct; (3) substantial certainty that death or serious bodily injury will result from one's conduct. While it might be suggested that the
legislature did not really intend second degree murder to be
a crime of specific intent, the controlling fact is that the plain
meaning of the words "intentionally" and "with intent" refute
such suggestion.'
A literal reading of subsection (1) (a) of the second degree
murder statute 92 indicates that, contrary to prior Colorado
law, the principle of transferred intent is not recognized in
the case of second degree murder.' 3 In both the case of first
degree murder' 4 and second degree murder under subsection
(1) (b),' the actor who possesses the culpable mental state
and causes death by his conduct is criminally responsible even
when the person killed is someone other than the intended
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an
offense charged in the indictment or information. An offense
is so included when:
(c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect
that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person,
property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
OId. § 40-1-601(6).
91 Specific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender
must have subjectively desired the prohibited result. Where, however,
a specific intent is not made an ingredient of a statutory offense, it is
not necessary to prove such specific intent in order to justify a conviction. In such case (general intent), the commission of the act willfully and knowingly is sufficient. (emphasis added) 22 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 32 (1961), cited in Armijo v. People, 157 Colo. 217, 219, 402 P.2d
79, 80 (1965). As the specific mens rea of second degree murder has
been made a statutory element of the offense, it is clearly a crime of
sepecific intent. In contrast, the Colorado rape statute, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40-3-401 (Supp. 1971), which has no mens rea specified, is a
crime of general intent.
92 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-103 (Supp. 1971).
113 See discussion, note 17 supra.
114 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-102(1) (a) (d) (Supp. 1971).
0J5Id. § 40-3-103 (1) (b).
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victim. But for second degree murder, under subsection (1) (a),96
the person killed ostensibly must be the person whom the actor
intended to kill. It would appear that this statutory shortcoming
is an oversight in drafting and might conceivably be corrected
by the construction of this subsection in pari materia with
subsection (1) (b) of the second degree murder statute,9" and
8
section 40-3-102(1), which defines first degree murder
The most perplexing problem under the Criminal Code
in the case of second degree murder concerns the concept of
diminished responsibility. In the case of second degree murder,
section 40-3-102 (2) provides that "diminished responsibility due
to lack of mental capacity is not a defense to murder in the
second degree." '9 Under the principle of diminished responsibility, evidence of an impaired mental condition, short of legal
insanity, traditionally has been admissible in order to negate
the specific intent requirements for a particular crime. 100 Since
under prior Colorado law second degree murder was not a
crime of specific intent, the principle was not applicable. 10
The dilemma created by the subsection on diminished responsibility is that it negates the very definition of second degree
02
murder.
Second degree murder by statutory definition requires a
specific intent to either cause death or to cause serious bodily
injury. If the provision on diminished responsibility is construed as descriptive of the offense of second degree murder,
then second degree murder requires no intent at all, and the
statutory definition of the crime itself is illusory. Such a construction produces the absurd and invalid result of second
degree murder requiring only the causation of another's death
without intention or any mens rea at all.
The Supreme Court of the United States has refused to
give effect to the "inexplicably contradictory commands in
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
00

§ 40-3-103 (1) (a).

§ 40-3-103(1) (b).
§ 40-3-102(1).
§ 40-3-103 (2).

§ 39-8-1 (Supp. 1967), amending COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 39-8-1 (1963); COLO. R. CaM. P. 11(f); Watkins v. People,
158 Colo. 485, 408 P.2d 425 (1965); McPhee v. People, 105 Colo. 539, 100
P.2d 148 (1940); Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256, 87 P. 79 (1906).
101 E.g., Watkins v. People, 158 Colo. 485, 408 P.2d 425 ('1965).
102 The Criminal Code, however, in the general section on responsibility,
'

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.

sanctions the admissibility of evidence of an impaired mental condition,
or intoxication, as bearing on the capacity of the accused tx form the
requisite specific intent required for a particular offense. COLO. Ixv.
STAT. ANN. § 40-1-903 (Supp. 1971). By negating the culpability requirements of second degree murder, § 40-3-103 (1) (b) runs afoul of the
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statutes ordaining criminal penalties."' 10 3 As Justice Douglas
stated in United States v. Cardiff: "Words which are vague
and fluid . . . may be as much of a trap for the innocent as
the ancient law of Caligula.'- 0 4 When the statutory definition
of murder in the second degree is juxtaposed with the provision relating to diminished responsibility, the definition of
second degree murder fails to make sense. For the statute in
one breath requires that death or serious bodily injury be
caused intentionally, and in the next breath, it mandates that
the inability to form the requisite specific intent is not a defense. If the statutory definition of second degree murder is
to be salvaged, then it would seem that the subsection relating to diminished responsibility must be nullified.
III.

MANSLAUGHTER

Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Code, manslaughter
was divided by statute into voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. 105 The Criminal Code abolishes this distinction and
broadens the statutory definition of manslaughter and includes
both what was formerly known as voluntary manslaughter
and other homicides not previously defined by Colorado statute. Section 40-3-104(1) of the Criminal Code provides as
follows:
A person commits the crime of manslaugther if:
(a) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(b) He intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide; or
(c) With intent to cause the death of a person other than
himself, he causes the death of that person, or of another person, under circumstances where the act causing
the death was performed, without premeditation, upon a
(1)

sudden heat of passion caused by a serious and highly provoking act, affecting the person killing sufficiently to excite

an irresistible passion in a reasonable person; but if between
the provocation and the killing there is an interval sufficient
of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing
for the voice
06

is murder.

basic constitutional requirement that the prosecution must prove "every
material element of every charge (100 percent of the total crime) by

evidence sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt." People v. District

Ct., 165 Colo. 253, 265, 439 P.2d 741, 747 (1965). As the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized in People v. District Ct., "mental capacity to

commit a crime is a material part of total guilt for there can be no
crime without the means rea." Id.
lo3 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).

344 U.S. 174 (1952).
105 Ch. 25, §§ 710-11, [1883] Colo. Sess. Laws 150 (now COLO.
ANN. § 40-2-4 (1963)).
0 6
1
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104 (Supp. 1971).
104
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Manslaughter is a class 4 felony carrying a penalty of 1 to
10 years. 107
A.

Recklessly Causing Death

Under the Criminal Code, the gist of reckless conduct
consists of a state of awareness and conscious disregard of a
high risk situation amounting to a willful and wanton deviation
from reasonable care. 08 "Wilful and wanton [conduct]
. .
means conduct purposefully committed which the person knew
or reasonably should have known was dangerous to another's
person or property, and which he performed without regard
to consequences ....
"10' Thus, recklessness "resembles acting
knowingly in that a state of awareness is involved but the
awareness is of risk, that is of probability rather than certainty;
the matter is contingent from the actor's point of view."' 10
The recklessness required for manslaughter was formerly
encompassed within the concept of criminal negligence, which
was an essential culpability requirement for the misdemeanor
of involuntary manslaughter under prior Colorado law."' As
112
the Colorado Supreme Court recognized in Trujillo v. People,
the degree of negligence necessary to sustain a charge of involuntary manslaughter was identical to the degree of negligence necessary to support a claim under the guest statute.
The meaning of willful and wanton under the guest cases is
virtually identical to the definition of recklessness under the
Criminal Code. 113 The net effect, therefore, of subsection (1) (a)
of the manslaughter statute is to encompass within its felony
provisions the same conduct that was formerly proscribed as
involuntary manslaughter, a misdemeanor.
B.

Causing or Aiding Suicide

At common law suicide was a felony, and a person who
was present at the suicide and assisted in its commission was
107 Id. § 40-3-104(2).
lo8 Id. § 40-1-601 (8).

109 Id.
l0 MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Since
recklessness involves a lesser degree of culpability than an intentional
killing, manslaughter under § 1 (a) of 40-2-104 qualifies as a lesser included offense of murder under the Criminal Code. See COLO.

STAT. ANN. § 40-1-508(5)(c)
(Supp. 1971).
111Trujillo v. People, 133 Colo. 186, 292 P.2d 980 (1956).
112

13

REV.

Id.

E.g., Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954). See generally Comment, Recent Construction of the Colorado Guest Statute, 33
U. COLO. L. REV. 374 (1961). See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104(1)
(a)

(Supp. 1971).
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guilty of murder. 114 However, one who instigated the suicide
and was absent at the time of the suicide was an accessory
before the act and escaped punishment under the artificial
rule of common law that an accessory could not be tried until
the principal was convicted.1 1 5 Although some states proscribe
suicide as a crime, a strong opinion exists that "this is not an
area in which the penal law can be effective and that its intrusion on such tragedies is an abuse. 1 1 1 The Colorado Criminal
Code does not make suicide itself a crime.
The causing or aiding of suicide was not previously proscribed in Colorado by statute. However, such conduct involves
behavior which the criminal law can reasonably be expected
to proscribe. Although at least one state has held that aiding
suicide is not a crime upon the ground that suicide itself is
noncriminal,' 1 7 most states treat the conduct as manslaughter
or a separate crime of comparable severity.' i8 Subsection (1) (b)
of the manslaughter statute treats with equal gravity "the
intentional causing" and "the intentional aiding" of another
to commit suicide. It would seem that if a person by force,
duress, or fraud causes the suicide, it might reasonably be
punished as murder. The Model Penal Code takes this approach, reasoning that "flagrant murders may be perpetrated
' 19
by deliberately forcing or coercing self-destruction."
C.

Killing in Heat of Passion

Subsection (1) (c) of the manslaughter statute essentially
reenacts in less awkward language the former statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter. Under prior Colorado law,
voluntary manslaughter was the intentional killing of another
in heat of passion caused by a serious and highly provoking
injury inflicted upon the slayer sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person.1'2" By case law it was not
essential that the injury inflicted on the slayer be a physical

114See Annot.,
115 Id.

13 A.L.R. 1259 (1921); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1180 (1934).

§ 201.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
117Aven v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925); Sanders v.
State, 54 Tex. Crim. 101, 112 S.W. 68 (1908); Grace v. State, 44 Tex.
Crim. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902).
118 Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903); Commonwealth v.
Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 S.W. 265 (1904); People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187,
178 N.W. 690 (1920); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
119 MODEL PFNAL CODE § 201.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
120 Ch. 25, § 711, [1883] Colo. Sess. Laws 150 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
116 MODEL PENAL CODE

§§ 40-2-5, 6 (1963)).
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injury;' 21 nor was it necessary that the provocation immediately
precede the act of killing.12 " Although the issue of "cooling
time" was technically one of law,'123: the issue was traditionally
resolved in favor of the defendant by submitting voluntary manslaughter to the jury upon any evidence, however unreasonable or slight, which tended to reduce the homicide to man1 24
slaughter.
The Criminal Code has expressly retained the concept of
the hypothetical reasonable person in determining the sufficiency of the provocation. It has been critically argued that
"to require . . . that the provocation be enough to make a
reasonable man do as the defendant did is patently absurd;
the reasonable man quite plainly does not kill."'1 25 A more
flexible standard, in terms of allowing the jury to differentiate
between the special factors in the actor's situation which relate
to his mental state, would have been to adopt the Model Penal
Code's approach of determining the reasonableness of his actions "from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation
under the circumstances as he believes them to be."'112 Prior
Colorado case law, however, particularly within the context
of self-defense, furnishes support for the proposition that the
actor has the right to act upon appearances, even if they are
false; 127 and his culpability in highly provoking circumstances
is not determined strictly on the basis of the hypothetical reasonable person. 128 In other words, the actor can be mistaken
in his belief and even arguably inappropriate in his actions,
so long as his belief and actions are reasonable under the facts
as they appeared to him at the time.
The Criminal Code's retention of the concept of "irresistible
passion" is also unfortunate. If a passion is in fact irresistible,
even to a reasonable person, then how can the act itself meet
the minimum requirement of criminal culpability - voluntariSee Ferrin v. People 164 Colo. 130, 433 P.2d 108 (1967); Baker v. People,
114 Colo. 50, 160 P.2d 983 (1945).
122 Ferrin v. People, 164 Colo. 130, 433 P.2d 108 (1967).
123 Wickham v. People, 41 Colo. 345, 93 P. 478 (1907).
124 E.g., Ferrin v. People, 164 Colo. 130, 433 P.2d 108 (1967); Read v. People,
119 Colo. 506, 205 P.2d 233 (1949).
125 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See also
Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 Chmv. L. REV. 740,
742.
126 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
127 E.g., LaVoie v. People, 155 Colo. 551, 395 P.2d 1001 (1964); Young v.
People, 47 Colo. 352, 107 P. 274 (1910).
128 Vigil v. People, 143 Colo. 328, 353 P.2d 82 (1960).
121
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ness? 129 Additionally, it can be argued that if in fact the passion is irresistible to a reasonable person, and was caused by a
threat or use of physical force by the victim, then no criminal
liability for manslaughter attaches to the killing. For under the
Criminal Code's definition of duress in section 40-1-808, it is
expressly provided:
A person may not be convicted of an offense, other than a
class 1 felony, based upon conduct in which he engaged because

of the use or threatened use of unlawful force upon him or upon
another person, which force or threatened use thereof a reason130
able person in his situation would have been unable to resist.

The alternatives of outcome in such a case appear to be first
degree murder or acquittal. Employing the rule of strict construction of criminal statutes to the benefit of the accused, " 1
it would seem that where the killing was the result of a threat
or use of force by the victim upon the slayer, sufficient to
render the provocation reasonably irresistible, then the killing
is noncriminal. This patent inconsistency between the culpability requirements of manslaughter on the one hand and the
concepts of voluntariness and duress on the other should be
resolved by legislative amendment.
IV.

CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

Section 40-3-105 of the Criminal Code provides that a person can commit the misdemeanor of criminally negligent homicide in either of two ways: (a) causing death by conduct
amounting to criminal negligence; (b) intentionally causing
death "in the good faith but unreasonable belief that one or
132
more grounds for justification exist."
A.

Death by Criminal Negligence

Under prior Colorado law, criminal negligence consisted of
that wilful and wanton conduct presently encompassed within
the concept of recklessness under the Criminal Code; 133 conduct
which fell short of wilful and wanton was not criminal negligence. Thus, the former misdemeanor of involuntary manslaughter required criminal negligence consisting of wilful and
wanton conduct,13 4 and that form of conduct is now punishable
129 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
30

§ 40-1-602 (Supp. 1971).

1 1d. § 40-1-808.
131

E.g., O'Brien v. People, 118 Colo. 58, 192 P.2d 428 (1948); People v.

Mooney, 87 Colo. 567, 290 P. 271 (1930); Sheely v. People, 54 Colo. 136,
129 P. 201 (1912); Robinson v. People, 23 Colo. 123, 46 P. 676 (1896).
132 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-3-105 (Supp. 1971).

133 See text accompanying notes 108-113 supra.
134 Id.
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as manslaughter under the Criminal Code.13 5 For purposes of
a prosecution for criminally negligent homicide under subsection 40-3-105(1) (a), criminal negligence consists in the failure
to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk. 136
The essential difference between recklessness and criminal
negligence is that "the reckless actor 'consciously disregards' a
substantial and unjustifiable risk created by his conduct while
the negligent actor merely 'should be aware' of the danger he
creates.' 13

7

The effect, therefore, of the statutory definition in

subsection (1) (a) of criminally negligent homicide is to proscribe conduct amounting to inadvertence, when that inadvertence causes death. The definition of criminal negligence
also requires that the risk "be of such a nature and degree
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the reasonable standard of care ....
,"'3 The rationale
of this requirement has been explained as follows:
[J]ustice is sufficiently safeguarded by insisting on substan-

tial culpability or deviation; that these items preclude the proper
condemnation of inadvertent risk creation unless "the significance
of the circumstances of fact would be apparent to one who shares
the community's general sense of right and wrong. . . ." They
also serve . . . to convict conduct which is inadvertent as to

risk only because the actor is insensitive to the interests and
139
claims of other persons in society.

It can be anticipated that prosecutions for criminally negligent homicide will frequently be utilized in traffic deaths where
the negligent driving of the defendant falls short of either
recklessness or vehicular homicide.
The Criminal Code expressly sanctions the consideration
of state statutes and municipal ordinances regulating the defendant's conduct on the issue of criminal negligence. 140 However, a violation of a statute or ordinance would not necessarily constitute prima facie evidence of criminal negligence.
For example, a technical or minor violation of a traffic ordinance which results in death would probably not in itself
amount to the gross deviation from reasonable care necessary
for criminal negligence.
Since the Criminal Code fails to define causation,' 4 ' it is
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104(1) (a) (Supp. 1971).
136Id. § 40-3-105(1) (a).
137 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
138 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(9)
(Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
139 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
140 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-601(9) (Supp. 1971).
135

141 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
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arguable that for criminal liability the negligent conduct must
142
At any rate, the
be the sole proximate cause of the death.
causal requirement should at least be the proximate cause
143
requirement of civil liability.
B. Death by Unreasonable Belief in Justification
The second type of criminally negligent homicide under
the Criminal Code consists of intentionally causing "the death
of a person in the good faith but unreasonable belief that one
1 44
The statutory law
or more grounds for justification exist.'
of justification under the Criminal Code generally attempts to
formulate justifications for the use of physical force that might
otherwise be unlawful. In the case of certain custodial rela145
and in the
tionships (such as parent, guardian, or warden) ,'
an espreventing
or
arrest
an
case of a peace officer effecting
146
the extent of physical force which lawfully can be
cape,
employed is now expressly delineated by statute.
Colorado did not previously distinguish between the use
of force in defense of person on the one hand and property on
the other. Nor was any situational distinction made between
deadly physical force and nondeadly physical force. The issue
of self-defense was resolved within the standards of "the rea147
sonableness of the fear" and "the necessity of the force.'
Under the Criminal Code, "[d]eadly physical force may be
used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force
is inadequate," and he reasonably believes that he or another
person is in imminent danger of being killed or receiving great
bodily harm. 14 Certain criminal acts - such as the threatened or
actual use of force by a burglar against an occupant, kidnapping,
robbery, rape, deviate sexual intercourse, and certain assaults
- justify the use of deadly physical force if a lesser degree of
1 49
Reasonable nonforce reasonably appears to be inadequate.
See Goodell v. People, 137 Colo. 507, 227 P.2d 279 (1958).
In a civil case where there are concurrent causes, and the defendant's
conduct was a proximate cause but not the most immediate cause, the
defendant is liable so long as his conduct concurred with other causes.
See Moore v. Standard Paint & Glass Co., 145 Colo. 151, 358 P.2d 33
(1960); Barlow v. North Sterling Irrig. Dist., 85 Colo. 488, 277 P. 469
(1929); Ryan Gulch Res. Co. v. Swartz, 82 Colo. 225, 263 P. 728 (1928);
Colorado Mort. & Inv. Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 540, 136 P. 1039 (1913).
44
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-105(1) (b) (Supp. 1971).
145 Id. § 40-1-803 (1) (2).
146 Id. § 40-1-807.
147 Sections 28-30, [1861] Colo. Sess. Laws 294 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-2-13 to -15 (1963)).
148 Ch. 46, § 1, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40-1-804 (Supp. 1971).
149 Id. § 40-1-804(2) (c).
142

143
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deadly physical force may be employed in defense of premises or
property. 150
The effect of subsection (1) (b) of the criminally negligent homicide section is to render the actor criminally liable
for causing death intentionally if the actor subjectively acts in
good faith but by objective standards is unreasonable in his
belief concerning justification. Since the statute does not require the actor to be criminally negligent in his belief (i.e., a
gross deviation from reasonable care), it appears that ordinary
negligence in belief will result in criminal liability. Of course,
the actor still has the right to act upon appearances, even if the
appearances are false; 151 so long as his belief in justification
is reasonable under the facts as they appeared, he can be mistaken without being criminally culpable. In the case where
the actor reasonably and correctly believes that property or
premises only are being threatened, with no danger to human
life, and nevertheless proceeds to use deadly physical force
against the perpetrator, his culpability under the Criminal Code
could be greater than that of criminally negligent homicide.
The deliberate use of deadly force in such a case is hardly
the "good faith" contemplated by the definition of criminally
negligent homicide, and the act could be prosecuted as murder.
V. VEmcuLR HOMICIDE
Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Code, causing death
by the operation of a motor vehicle was expressly proscribed
in two separate sections of Colorado statutory law. The prior
law provided that any person who proximately caused the
death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a reckless
152
manner was guilty of a felony punishable by 1 to 14 years.
153
Reckless conduct meant either wilful or wanton conduct.
Additionally, any person who, while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or exhilarating or stupifying drugs, caused
the death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a reckless,
negligent, or careless manner or with a wilful or reckless dis54
regard of human life, was guilty of a felony.
Id. §§ 40-1-805, 806.
See note 127 supra.
152 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-155 (Supp. 1965).
153 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-31 (1963); Martin v. People, 495 P.2d 537
(Colo. 1972).
154 Ch. 95, § 1, [1923] Colo. Sess. Laws 256 (now CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §
49-2-10 (1963)). Section 40-3-106 of the Criminal Code repeals CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-10 (1963) but does not affect CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-5-155 (Supp. 1965).
Under the Criminal Code vehicular
homicide is a class 4 felony punishable by 1 to 10 years. COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-106, 40-1-105 (Supp. 1971).
150
151
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Prosecutions under the prior vehicular homicide statute
frequently involved issues relating to the technical sufficiency
of the charge. Thus, in Espinoza v. People,155 an information
phrased in the disjunctive- that the defendant while under
the influence caused death by operating a motor vehicle in
a reckless, careless, and negligent manner or with reckless and
wanton disregard of human life- was held defective. And in
Goodell v. People,156 in which the information alleged that the
defendant caused death while under the influence and by
operating a motor vehicle in a reckless, negligent, and careless
manner and with a reckless and wanton disregard of human
life, the supreme court held that the conjunctive charge required proof of the higher form of negligence- recklessness.
In Goodell,157 the court recognized that a valid prosecution
could be predicated upon simple negligence plus intoxication
if it were so pleaded.
Section 40-3-106 of the Criminal Code should remove much
of the confusion surrounding the technical nature of the pleading. It provides that vehicular homicide can be committed in
either of two ways: (1) if a person operates a motor vehicle
in a reckless manner and such conduct is the proximate cause
of the death of another; (2) if a person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of any drug or intoxicant and
such conduct is the proximate cause of death. 158 The Criminal
Code's definition of recklessness is applicable to prosecutions
for vehicular homicide. 15 9 As both sections are cast in terms
of "proximate cause," Colorado case law holding that the defendant's conduct must be the sole proximate cause of the ac160
cident would appear to be applicable to the new statute.
By case law a person is under the influence when his capacity
6
to operate a motor vehicle is impaired even in the slightest.'
The new statute does not define a motor vehicle, but this can
be cured by either judicial construction or a legislative addition adopting the present definition stated elsewhere in the
1 62
statutes.
155 142 Colo. 96, 349 P.2d 689 (1960).
156 137 Colo. 507, 327 P.2d 279 (1958).
157 Id.
158 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-106 (Supp. 1971).
159 Id. § 40-1-601(8).
160 Goodell v. People, 137 Colo. 507, 327 P.2d 279 (1958).
Rinehart v. People, 105 Colo. 123, 95 P.2d 10 (1939).
162 COLa. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-1 (Supp. 1969), formerly Ch. 122, § 1,
[1931] Colo. Sess. Laws 485, provides:
(1) "Vehicle," any device which is capable of moving
161
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CONCLUSION

The psychological element in homicide is complex. A person may intend to kill another and proceed to kill for a myriad
of reasons: self-preservation, revenge engendered by great
provocation, or selfish financial gain. In each case, the intent
is the same, but the act in its totality is radically different.
Because of the complexity and finality of the act, and the
severity of penalties attaching to unjustified killings, the need
for coherency of definition is compelling. Coherency of definition for criminal acts provides the pubic with intelligible proscriptions and a forewarning of penalty; and equally important,
it enhances the evenhanded application of the law.
Unfortunately, the Criminal Code's treatment of homicides,
in several instances, lacks coherency of definition. The overlapping and, at times, the inconsistency with respect to basic
concepts of criminal culpability can only foster an unhealthy
ambivalence in all stages of the criminal process. The Criminal
Code will undoubtedly burden an already overburdened appellate court with issues of definition and scope which could have
been resolved at the legislative stages.

itself, or of being moved, from place to place upon wheels
or endless tracks; but such term shall not mean or include
any farm tractor or any implement of husbandry designed primarily or exclusively for use and used in agriculture operations, or any device moved by muscular power, or moved exclusively over stationary rails or tracks or designed to move
primarily through the air.
(2) "Motor vehicle," any self-propelled vehicle which is
designed primarily for travel on the public highways and
which is generally and commonly used to transport persons
and property over the public highways.

